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STUDENT NOTES
FooD-REs IPSA LoQmTR As APPIED TO Sui s AGAINST THE MANU-
FACTURER OR PREPARER OF ARTIOLES INTENDED FOR HUMAN CONSumPTION.
A mere showing that plaintiff had drunk Coca Cola from a bottle
in which a partly decomposed mouse was found, and thereby became
violently ill, held sufficient to support a judgment for the plaintiff
even though defendant's evidence disclosed a practice of most scrupu-
lous care in the bottling of its product. Coca Cola Bottling Co., of
Shelbyville v. Creech.
The rule of this case strikingly illustrates the recent extension of
this doctrine far beyond its original confines. When first enunciated
and until very recently the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was strictly
liliited to cases involving the presence of external physical force such
as: the falling of defendant's building into the street 2; a brick falling
on plaintiff from defendant's dilapidated wall3 ; the falling of the
pole of a toll gate while plaintiff was passing thereunder. In the
following cases its application was denied: plaintiff injured by the
bursting of a fly-wheel used by defendant; the bursting of a boiler
or engine6 ; or the fall of an elevator.
As illustrative of the novelty of its extension to cases involving
articles intended for human consumption no mention of such applica-
tion is found in the great treatises by Wigmore and McKelvey on Evi-
dence, nor by Burdick, Salmond, and Bohlen on the law of Torts.
The reluctance of courts generally to extend this doctrine may be
attributed in some measure to their predilection for grounding the
manufacturer's liability to the ultimate consumer in contract. As
Mr. Burdick puts it in the fourth edition of his work on The Law of
Torts at page 515. "Except in such cases as have just been referred
to, where the defendant has bound himself by contract to do some-
thing safely, or where a valid statute imposes a similar obligation, the
phrase, res ipsa loquitur,-is rarely to be applied literally." It will
be seen in the following discussion that those courts which still fol-
low the contract theory of liability are very loatt to extend the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur. However, the modern weight of authority
1245 Ky. 414, 53 S. W. (2d) 745 (1932).
2 Mullen v. St. John, 57 N. Y. 567 (1874).
3 Murray v. McShane, 52 Md. 217, 36 Am. Rep. 369 (1879).4 Hyde's Ferry Turnpike Co. v. Yates, 108 Tenn. 428, 67 S. W. 69
(1902)
rPiehl v. Albany Ry. Co., 162 N. Y. 617, 57 N. E. 1122 (1900).6 Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N. Y. 476, 10 Am. Rep. 623 (1873) ; Marshall
v. Westwood, 38 N. J. L. 339, 20 Am. Rep . 394 (1876).
Griffen. v. Manice, 166 N. Y. 188, 59 N. E. 925, 52 L. R. A. 922
(1901).
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is to the effect that such actions are to be grounded in negligence and
not in contract.'
Massachusetts is the chief exponent of the contract theory ci
liability. That court while admitting that "apparently the larger
number of decisions by courts of this country hold that the liability of
the innkeeper and restaurant keeper for furnishing deleterious food
rests upon negligence" concludes that in its opinion "the obligation
resting upon defendant and accruing to plaintiff arose out of coh-
tract."' Virginia also follows the contract theory.3'
The courts are in evident confusion as to the exact significance
of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as applied to foods. However, a
good definition is found in the language of Justice Pitney.1' "That the
facts of the occurrences warrant the inference of negligence not that
they compel such an inference; that they furnish circumstantial evi-
dence of negligence where direct evidence of it may be lacking, but
It is evidence to be weighed, not necessarily to be accepted as sufficient;
that they call for explanation or rebuttal, not necessarily that they
require it; that they make a case to be decided by the jury, not that
they forestall the verdict. Res ipsa loquitur where it applies does not
convert the defendant's general issue into an affirmative defense.
When all the evidence is in, the question for the jury is whether the
preponderance of it is with the plaintiff." As Mr. Wigmore puts it
"the risk of jury-doubt is on the plaintiff, but the duty of passing the
judge is shifted by presumption of law to defendant."'2
Confusion and discrepancies of phraseology have arisen as to the
sufficiency of this counter evidence. Although it is apparent that to
meet a prima facie case one need only offer evidence tending to prove
his freedom therefrom, yet where the magic words res ipsa loquitur
are used some courts, among them our own, immediately require an-
other type of counter evidence. Here proof of the exercise of highest
care is held insufficient. The defendant must explain, must show
what caused the injury complained of if not his negligence. The Ken-
tucky Court f Appeals said in the case of Liggett 4 Myers Tobacco
Co. v. Rankin (supra) a case where a wooly worm was imbedded in
a plug of chewing tobacco. "Where the thing which caused the injury
complained of is shown to be under the management of defendant or
a Liggett and Myers Tob. Co. v. Rankin, 246 Ky. 65, 54 S. W. (2d)
612 (1932); Atlanta Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Sinyard, 45 Ga. App.
272, 164 S. E. 231 (1932); Davis v. VanCamp Packing Co., 189 Ia. 775,
176 N. W. 382, 17 A. L. R. 649 (1920); Corin v. Kresge Co., 166 Atl.
291 (N. J., 1933); Merrill v. Hodgson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 Atl. 533 (1914);
Upton v. Harrison, 68 Fed. (2d) 232 (1934); McCarley v. Woods Drug
Go., 153 So. 446 (Ala. 1934); Brown Cracker & Candy Co. v. Jensen, 32
S. W. (2d) 227 (Tex. 1930).
1Friends v. Childs Dining Hall, 231 Mass. 65, 120 N. F. 407 (1918).
'Norfolk Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Krausse, 173 S. E. 497 (Va.
1934).
nSweeney v. Rrving, 228 U. S. 233, 240, 57 L. Ed. 815 (1914).
22Wigmore, Pocket Code of Evidence, Section 2062.
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his servants and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not happen if those who have the management or control
use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in absence of explana-
tion (italics our own) of the defendant that the accident arose from
want of care." In the principal case defendant's evidence disclosed a
practice of most scrupulous care, still it was held insufficient to
counteract plaintiff's prima facie case. Likewise a Pennsylvania court
has saids: "It is a case where the accident proves its own negligent
cause and the jury would be permitted to infer negligence, as the court
below instructed it, from the fact that ground glass had been found
in the bottom of the bottle. The particular dereliction is not shown,
nor was it necessary. The negligent act is demonstrated by showing
glass in the bottom of the bottle." In accord with this view of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine are also the decisions of Georgia" and
Mississippi."
Another view more harmonious with Mr. Wigmore's concept of
the doctrine is that followed in: Rhode Island"O; California7 ; New
Jersey"; Iowa"; Louisiana20 ; New York"; and in England". This
view is best stated by the Rhode Island court." "If a person is injured
by a food product in the original package in whiclh it was put up by
the maker and that in that package was a substance which was harm-
ful or injurious to the human body and he shows that to the satisfac-
tion of the jury then a presumption arises that the manufacturer of
that product was negligent in its manufacture." The court goes on
to say that this presumption is defeated by proof of absence of negli-
gence.
This probably represents the majority view and, as pointed out is
believed to be more consonant with the true meaning of res ipsa
loquitur than the view obtaining in Kentucky.
Rozumailski v. Phila. Coca Cola Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145 At. 700,
701 (1929) in ace. Madden v. Grt. Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 106 Pa. Sup. Ct.
474, 162 Atl. 687 (1932) (dead mouse in package of tea.)
14 Slaughter v. Atlanta Coca Cola Co., 172 S. E. 723 (1934) (caustic
matter in Coca Cola); Atlanta Coca Cola Co. v. Binyard (supra).
"Pillars v. R. J. Reynolds Tob. Go., 117 Miss. 490, 78 So. 365 (1918)
(human toe in chewing tobacco).
"Minutilla v. Providence Ice Crean Co., 50 R. I. 143, 144 Atl. 884
(1929) (glass in ice cream).
17 Steil v. Townsend-Calif. Glace Fruit Co., 28 Pac. (2d) 1077
(1934) (spoiled fish).
uCarbone v. Cal i. Pack. Co., 169 Atl. 866 (1934) (medicated band-
age in can of peaches.); Cassini v. Curtis Candy Co., 172 Atl. 519
(1934) (worm in bar of candy).
" Davis v. VanCamp Pack. Co., (supra) (harmful substance in
beans).
VCostello v. Cafeteria Co., 18 La. App. 40, 135 So. 245 (1931).
= Ternay v. Ward Bak. Co., 167 N. Y. Supp. 562 (1917) (glass in
bread); Freeman v. Schultz Bread Co., 163 N. Y. Supp. 396 (1916) (nail
in bread).
"Chaproniere v. Mason, 21 Times L. Rep. 633 (1905) (stone in
bun).
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The federal courts2, Tennessee4 , and Virginias give such evidence
presumptive force in the absence of any opposing evidence but this
presumption is dissipated immediately on the presentation of counter
evidence. Tennessee has, foolishly it seems, refused to extend it to
cover such things as chewing tobacco, holding that it is to be applied
only to food.m
MassachusettsF. North Carolina, Minnesota,2 Alabama,30 and
Illinois'" have refused to extend the doctrine to articles intended for
human consumption. The view of these courts is that a mere show-
ing that injury happened to plaintiff as a result of the deleterious
character of the article raises no presumption of negligence on the
part of one who prepared or manufactured the article and is in-
sufficient to take the case to the jury.
As has been shown there are four distinct views of this doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur. Applying these to the facts of the principal case
where plaintiff proved only the purchase of a beverage containing a
decomposed mouse;-that he, without knowledge, drank therefrom and
became violently ill, we shall see what proof ig required of defendant
to avoid liability under the various rules.
Under the Kentucky rule he must prove not only that he was not
negligent but must show in fact what caused the mouse to be in the
bottle.
Under the majority rule he must prove that he exercised ordinary
care under all of the circumstances.
Under the federal rule he can avoid liability by offering some
evidence of the exercise of ordinary care. The presumption in favor
of negligence dissolves when such testimony is offered.
Under the Massachusetts rule he need not offer any evidence and
is entitled to a directed verdict.
It is submitted that the majority rule is not only sound logically
but also reaches a more equitable result. While it excuses the plaintiff
from that which from the very nature of the occurrence is likely to
"Nichols v. Cont. Bak. Co., 34 Fed. (2d) 141 (1929) (dead cock-
roach in loaf of bread).
-"Merriman v. Coca Cola Co., 68 S. W. (2d) 149 (1934) (glass in
beverage bottle); Coca Cola Co. v. Rowland, 66 S. W. (2d) 272 (1934)
(decomposed mouse in Coca Cola bottle).
ZYorf0loc Coca Cola Co. v. Krausee, 173 S. E. 497 (1934); Riggsby
v. Trillon, 143 Va. 903, 129 S. E. 493 (1925).
M Liggett & Myers Tob. Co., 132 Tenn. 419, 178 S. W. 1009 (1916)
(bug pressed into plug of chewing tobacco). See contra Pillars v.
R. J. Reynolds Tob. Co., (supra).
"Friends v. Childs Dining Hall Co. (supra) (stones in baked
beans). Ash v. Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 86, 120 N. E. 396
(1918) (tack in blueberry pie). but see Tonsman v. Greenglass, 248
Mass. 275, 142 N. E. 756 (1924).
2Broom v. Monroe Coca Cola Co. 200 N. C. 55, 156 S. E. (1930).
9S wenson. v. Purity Baking Co., 183 Minn. 289, 236 N. W. 310
(1931) (larva of dead flour moth in loaf of bread).
3'McCarley v. Woods Drug Co. (supra).
a'Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 18, 45 N. E. 253 (1896).
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be beyond his knowledge, it also assures the defendant that if he can
prove he was not negligent no liability -will attach. Both results are
desirable.
The Kentucky rule might be criticized in that recovery would be
allowed plaintiff in spite of the fact that defendant proved he was
not negligent.
The federal rule is soundest of all technically but in actual prac-
tice is likely to result in injustice to a plaintiff who might be totally
unable to prove the particulars of defendant's negligence after the dis-
sipation of the general presumption.
The Massachusetts rule places plaintiff.in a position where, even
though the defendant may have been guilty of gross negligence, plaintiff
will be denied recovery because he is in no position to prove the par-
ticular acts of defendant.
ROBERT EDWIN HATTON, JR.
TRUSTs-THE CREATION OF A TRUST BY THE USE OF PRECATORY
WORDS.
At the outset, suffice it to say, that the particular type of trusts
dealt with in this brief note are those that are created wholly by
testamentary disposition of property, and not those trusts which arise
upon a conveyance inter-vivos.
As the foundation of our study a recent decision by the Kentucky
Court of Appeals has been chosen, which shall hereinafter be termed
the Williams case. Williams, et al. v. Williams' Committee, et al. 253
Ky. 30 (1934). The will in the Williams case contained the follow-
ing language: "I will to my wife all my property to be hers abso-
lutely. It is my desire and I request she will to her people one-half
of my property and to my people the. other one half". These words
were deemed sufficient to constitute a trust. The question now for
our consideration is whether the court acted properly in so holding.
To begin, let us consider only the last sentence without regarding
the first in which the property is given to the wife absolutely. The
writer is of the opinion that even in this instance the words are not
sufficient to show that the testator intended to create enforceable
duties by the use of such precatory words. To hold otherwise would
reach a result in direct conflict with the modern trend of the courts.
However, if such a result had been obtained a century or two ago in
an English jurisdiction it would probably have been correct. Harding
v. Glyn, 1 Atk. 469 (1739). Although even prior to this it was stated
by the court in Palmer v. Sehibb, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 291, pl. 9, where "J. S.
devises the residue of his estate to his wife, and desires her to give
all her estate at her death to his or her relations" that if testator had
desired his wife by his will to give at her death all the estate which
he had devised to her, to his or her relations, there the estate devised
to her ought to go after her death to his and her relations." But,
